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Abstract. This paper examines the influence of non-interest activities on bank lending in terms 
of loan quality and interest spread. We also investigate the possible existence of profit 
complementarities between non-interest activities and lending. Using quarterly data on 6,921 
U.S. commercial banks between 2007:Q3 to 2016:Q3 we find that non-interest activities have 
no adverse influence on bank credit risk. This is the case for banks of different asset size 
(including systemically important banks) as well as for distressed banks. There is evidence 
that banks with assets between $100 million and $1 billion that have a greater share of 
fiduciary income have lower credit risk. They also have lower interest rates on loans secured 
by real estate, and higher franchise values, particularly post-crisis. Moreover, banks in the 
aforementioned size range benefit from synergies in joint production of non-interest income 
and lending, whereas other banks, in particular smaller banks (below $100 million in assets) 
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1. Introduction 
Existing theories have conflicting predictions on the necessity of restricting bank 
activities. Engaging in different activities may exacerbate conflicts of interest (John, John and 
Saunders, 1994, and Saunders, 1994) and moral hazard problems (Boyd, Chang and Smith, 
1998). Moreover it may make banks too complex to be monitored and too big to discipline 
(Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004). Alternatively, fewer regulatory restrictions permit banks to 
realize economies of scope (Claessens and Klingebiel, 2001).  
Many works have looked into the risk implications of functional diversification in 
banking following deregulation  in the U.S. and Europe in the 1980's (DeYoung and Rice, 
2004; Stiroh 2004 & 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Lepetit et al, 2008) and also after the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2008 (De Jonghe, 2010; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; 
Brunnermeier, Dong and Palia, 2012; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Engle et al., 2014; De 
Jonghe, Diepstraten and Schepens, 2015; Williams, 2016 among others). Such studies show 
that, combined with traditional intermediation, non-interest activities generally contribute to 
higher standalone risk and systemic risk of financial institutions. As a result, post-crisis 
regulatory reforms in the U.S. and Europe (Dodd Frank Act, 2010; Liikanen Report, 2012 and 
the Independent Commission on Banking – Vickers Report, 2011) recommend restrictions on 
various banks' non-interest activities (International Monetary Fund, 2011).  
While previous work has focused on the broad diversification gains or on internal 
agency problems of mixing traditional intermediation and non-interest business lines,  this 
paper is the first (as far as we know) to  examine  how such non-traditional activities affect 
bank lending quality and pricing. Given that the empirical literature tends to find that 
diversification into non-interest areas (and particularly in more volatile businesses like 
investment banking) generally increases risk it is interesting to study whether recent 
diversification activity has the same influence on bank lending behavior in terms of credit risk 
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and interest spread. It is also of interest to examine whether behaviors have changed post-
global financial crisis, as banks have been moving out of the riskier areas of non-interest 
activities to meet tougher capital requirements dictated by Basel III and Dodd Frank. An 
analysis of these issues may identify whether any noticeable risk shifting has been taking 
place between non-interest activities and lending business as predicted by the model proposed 
by John et al. (1994). Boot and Ratnovski (2016) also present a model showing that 
combining long-term relationship banking and short-term transaction banking can undermine 
the former. We also investigate whether evidence of profit complementarity between lending 
and non-interest activities is prevalent in the post-crisis environment again highlighting 
potential merits or demerits of diversification. This is an area, which surprisingly has attracted 
little academic attention.  
 Bank lending can benefit from informational and synergy advantages associated with 
diverse activities. Moreover, fewer regulatory restrictions may increase banks' charter value 
and thereby encourage managers to behave more prudently (Barth, et al., 2004). Alternatively, 
getting into different activities may lead to agency problems and loss of focus. Bank loan 
pricing might also be affected by subsidization across interest-based and fee-based businesses.  
Theories of financial intermediation stress that banks can obtain inside information by 
developing close relationships with clients and thereby mitigate asymmetric information 
problems (Berger, 1999; Boot, 2000). Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) 
show that borrowers with longer relationships enjoy lower collateral requirements and more 
available credit. The building of such relationships can mitigate risk, as illustrated by Puri, 
Rochell and Steffen (2011) who find that borrowers with prior credit relationships (with 
German savings banks) default less. By examining 18,000 bank loans to small Belgian firms, 
Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) also show that interest rates tend to fall as the scope of the 
relationship expands. Hellmann, Lindsey and Puri (2008) find that prior relationships with 
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early stage venture capital firms increase the chances of bank loan origination. Firms may also 
benefit from established bank relationships by signaling their quality resulting in lower loan 
rates. Bharath et al. (2007) document the benefits of bank-borrower relationships from the 
perspective of the bank. They claim that strong previous lending relationships increase the 
chances of attracting new loan and investment banking business. 
Boot (2000) emphasizes that private customer-specific information is obtained through 
multiple interactions with the same client over time, often in the form of providing various 
financial services. The way information is collected and its nature changes when banks 
engage in more business lines. Banks can obtain information through more channels and have 
the opportunity to use this information with greater customer interaction. For very large 
banks, however, the reusability of proprietary information is likely to be limited, because they 
rely more on hard-information technologies, and provide different financial services through 
segregated subsidiary corporate structures. The interplay between lending and non-interest 
activities, therefore, is more likely to be pronounced for smaller banks.  
On the basis of extant theories and empirical literature we postulate that engaging in 
different non-interest activities can affect lending behavior for smaller banks and articulate 
three arguments in support of the hypothesis that broadening bank businesses can improve 
loan quality. First, through activity diversification, banks can gather more private information 
on client quality as well as access a wider array of potential borrowers. Second, information, 
relationship and reputational factors that can be acquired through various businesses can 
enhance banks‟ franchise value and hence increase the potential indirect costs of financial 
distress, leading to more prudent lending behavior (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Demsetz et 
al., 1996 and Gonzalez, 2005 show the negative relationship between banks‟ charter value and 
risk-taking). Finally, revenue from other business areas may also enhance lending as it 
enables banks to lower interest margins by facilitating information collection from clients. 
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Carbo and Rodriguez (2007) show that income from non-traditional activities influence net 
interest margins through possible cross-subsidization effects. However, the empirical 
evidence is not conclusive. For instance, Nguyen (2012) finds no clear evidence of a negative 
link between non-interest income and bank interest margins, whereas Lin et al. (2012) claim 
that non-interest income mitigates the sensitivity of interest margins to shocks. 
Non-interest activities also have various drawbacks. First, most fee-based activities are 
short-term in nature, and have lower switching costs than traditional banking (DeYoung and 
Roland, 2001); hence, in order to establish longer-term client relationships, banks may grant 
loans to cement non-interest income client relationships. Such a policy could, therefore, 
undermine the delegate-monitoring role of banks. Banks are expected to produce and convey 
information on the quality of borrowers, which could be biased if non-interest activities 
provide incentives for weaker loan screening and monitoring. Lepetit et al. (2008b) find that 
banks may underprice credit risk if they expect to obtain additional fees from borrowers. 
Second, greater reliance on non-interest activities may increase agency problems. Several 
studies show that agency costs stemming from exacerbated information asymmetries 
outweigh the benefits of activity diversification (Laeven and Levine, 2007; Elyasiani and 
Wang, 2009; Akhigbe and Stevenson 2010; Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2010)
1
. Third, 
expanding into non-interest activities could be to the detriment of lending. Boot and 
Ratnovski (2016) show that engaging in too much market-based activities damages 
relationship-banking. They highlight diseconomies of scope in combining traditional 
commercial banking and market-based activities, in particular when financial markets are 
deeper. Lastly, lower credit exposure may encourage managers to be less conservative in their 
loan-granting activities. 
                                                 
1
 Elsas, Hackethal and Holzhauser (2010) find that diversification improves bank value, and provide some 
evidence against the “conglomerate discount” proposed by Laeven and Levine (2007) and Elyasiani and Wang 
(2009). 
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In contrast to the afore-mentioned cross-country studies, in this paper we focus on the 
U.S - because of access to more information on the breakdowns of bank non-interest activities 
- and investigate the relationship between bank lending and diversification in eight major non-
interest business lines
2
. These range from activities such as fiduciary where clients entrust 
funds for asset management by the bank, to loan servicing which is directly attached to 
lending. We examine the influence of these activities on banks‟ lending in terms of loan 
quality and interest spread. We also investigate the possible existence of profit 
complementarity ((dis)economies of joint production) between non-interest activities and 
lending. 
We use quarterly data on 6,921 U.S. commercial banks between 2007:Q3 to 2016:Q3. 
Since the U.S. banking system is dominated by small banks and business models vary with 
size, we classify banks into three categories: those with less than $100 million in total assets 
(‘Small’ Banks), with total assets between $100 million and $1 billion („Medium‟ Banks) and 
with more than $1 billion in total assets (‘Large’ Banks). This is particularly important for our 
profit complementarity analysis because scope economies may depend on scale of operation, 
and it may not be achieved for too small banks. De Jonghe, Diepstraten and Schepens (2015) 
show that the impact of non-interest activities on banks‟ performance depends on size. 
However, they attribute the positive impact of non-interest activities on the risk of smaller 
banks to the opacity of such banks, whereas in this paper, using the three sub-samples, we 
examine the role of size in the economies of joint production. 
Overall, we do not find any significant evidence in favor of an adverse effect of non-
interest activities on credit risk for banks with different sizes including systemically important 
banks (assets more than $50bn) and even distressed banks. Our credit risk analysis for 
medium-size commercial banks with total assets between $100 million and $1 billion indicates 
                                                 
2
 Fiduciary, annuity sales, insurance services, loan servicing, loan sale, investment banking, securities brokerage 
and service charges on deposit accounts. 
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that banks that manage client investments (asset management) have lower credit risk. The 
relationship is stronger during the post-crisis period. These findings are robust across different 
specifications, credit risk proxies and estimation techniques. The results help explain the 
positive relationship between fiduciary and risk-adjusted returns shown by Stiroh (2004). 
Further investigation for this group of banks shows a positive association between fiduciary 
income and franchise value. Banks with a higher share of fiduciary income earn lower interest 
income on loans secured by real estate so it could be that preferential mortgage rates are being 
charged in „exchange‟ for managing clients‟ assets. 
We also find evidence of cross-subsidization for several non-interest activities and 
traditional lending-borrowing business, in particular for Large Banks. For instance, the 
interest rate on loans secured on real estate is negatively correlated to revenue generated from 
loan servicing and sales. Moreover, banks with higher income from investment banking have, 
on average, lower interest rates on C&I loans. This is particularly important, because previous 
studies (Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007 and Lepetit et al., 2008b) typically find more widespread 
evidence of cross-subsidization effects. In fact, we find that higher deposit services charges 
are associated with larger interest spreads, which suggests that banks do not use higher 
deposit fees to subsidize lending rates.  Our analysis of Small Banks (those with assets under 
$100 million) show little evidence of any significant link between non-interest activities, 
credit risk and price cross-subsidization
3
. Finally, we also investigate pair-wise profit 
complementarity and (dis)economies of joint production between lending and non-interest 
activities. We find evidence in support of scope economies for medium-size commercial 
banks, whereas other banks in particular small commercial banks suffer from diseconomies of 
joint production. This finding contributes to the literature and provides further evidence on the 
role of size and scope economies in U.S. banking.  
                                                 
3
 Non-interest income have too small weight in total operating income of these banks to affect their lending. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines our 
methodology and econometric specifications. Section 3 describes the data and summary 
statistics. Section 4 discusses the results and finally section 5 concludes. 
2. Econometric Specification and Methodology 
Our objective is to investigate the impact of non-interest activities on credit risk and 
interest spreads to seek any evidence on the existence of cross-subsidization between interest 
and non-interest businesses. For this purpose, we estimate the following dynamic panel 
models based on Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Carbo and Rodriguez (2007) and Delis and 
Kouretas (2011)
4
. The variables we consider are the determinants of credit risk and lending-
deposit spreads as highlighted in the literature (McShane and Sharpe, 1985; Clair, 1992; 
Angbazo, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Maudos and De Guevara, 2004; Dell‟Ariccia and 
Marquez, 2006; Ogura, 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008b; Foos, et al., 2010): 
Credit_Riski,t   =  α0 + α1×Credit_Riski,t-1 + ∑     
 
   ×Non-interest_Income_Activitiesk,i,t +  
α3×Capitali,t + α4×Risk_Weighted_Assets i,t + α5×Sizei,t + 
α6×Loan_Growthi,t + α7×Yield_on_Total_Loansi,t + α8×C&I_Loansi,t + 
α9×Agricultural_Loansi,t + α10×Consumer_Loansi,t + α11×All_Other_Loansi,t + 
α12×Short_Term_Loansi,t + α13×Loan_Commitmenti,t +  
∑                    
    
       + ∑                      
 
    + Ɛi,t           (1) 
Spreadi,t           =  β0 + β1×Spreadi,t-1 + ∑     
 
   ×Non-interest_Income_Activitiesk,i,t +  
β3×Capitali,t + β4×Infficiencyi,t + β5×Liquidityi,t + β6×Interest_Rate_Riski,t + 
β7×Core_Depositi,t + β8×Wagei,t + β9×Sizei,t +  
β10×C&I_Loansi,t + β11×Agricultural_Loansi,t + β12×Consumer_Loansi,t + 
β13×All_Other_Loansi,t + β14×Loan_Commitmenti,t +  
∑                    
    
       + ∑                      
 
    + ƞi,t           (2) 
 where individual banks and time dimension are represented by i and t subscripts, 
respectively. Variation in credit risk (Credit Risk) and lending-borrowing spread (Spread) are 
modelled in Equations (1) and (2) as a function of our variables of interest, namely, income 
shares from various non-interest activities including fiduciary activities, insurance, annuities, 
                                                 
4
 We need to address several econometric concerns in our study. We deal with the omitted-variable bias by 
introducing a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand-side of the equation (following Wooldridge 2016 p. 
283) and by applying panel estimation techniques. We also address this concern in sub-section 4.4.3. by using 
Heckman‟s self-selection model following Campa and Kedia (2002), and Laeven and Levine (2007).  
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loan servicing, investment banking and securities brokerage. These activities are expected to 
increase the scope of banking operations and extend relationships with borrowers. Moreover, 
we also take into account non-interest income from loan sales and service charges on deposit 
accounts. The latter represents how actively clients do banking (the scale of relationship) 
and/or banks‟ market power and pricing strategy with regard to servicing account holders. 
Both models include a range of bank-level control variables, and time fixed effects.  
We use a dynamic panel setting for our study as suggested by Carbo and Rodriguez 
(2007) and Delis and Kouretas (2011). This allows us to address the persistence in bank risk-
taking. We estimate the models using fixed effects, similar to Loutskina (2011)
5
.  
2.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
In model (1) we use the ratio of loan-loss provisions to average gross loans (Loan Loss 
Provision) as a proxy for Credit Risk. Loan loss provisions are a flow proxy for loan quality 
and reflect the adjustment of loan-loss reserves and write-offs. As a robustness check, we 
consider the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (Non-performing Loans). This 
consists of non-accrual loans and loans which are past due for 90 days or more and still 
accruing. These proxies are widely used in the literature as accounting-based credit risk 
indicators (for instance Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Gonzalez, 2005; Carbo and Rodriguez, 
2007; Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez and Molyneux, 2011).  
For the Spread model (Equation (2)) we follow the literature (Carbo and Rodriguez, 
2007; Lepetit et al., 2008b) and use the net interest spread, which is defined as 
                     
                            
 
                      
                                          
 (Spread).  
2.2. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
                                                 
5
 In the dynamic panel specification the lagged dependent variable becomes endogenous when the sample has a 
small time dimension (the literature considers this problematic for a sample with less than 15 time periods, 
whereas in this study we use 32 time periods). Roodman (2009) also suggests applying difference and system 
GMM techniques to panels with small T and large N. He points out that with large T, a dynamic panel bias 
becomes insignificant and the straightforward fixed effect technique can be used. In fact, the number of 
instruments in difference and system GMM tends to explode with T. 
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On the basis of the breakdown provided in the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC) 031 Reports of Income and Condition (Call Reports), and data 
availability, we consider eight major non-interest business lines that are expected  to influence 
customer credit relationships and banks‟ lending6.  
1) Income from fiduciary activities (Fiduciary). 
Clients using fiduciary services entrust their assets to banks for management or 
safekeeping against payment of a fee. Attracting such clients requires reputational 
capital and expertise in asset management. Hence, we expect successful banks to have 
a better chance of selling fiduciary services. Provision of fiduciary services can also 
improve loan quality, because a) banks can grant wealthy and relatively low-risk 
clients loans in order to strengthen wealth management ties. These clients may use 
their assets as collateral to borrow to fund traditional purchases (property etc). Such 
lending is collateralized and hence is less risky. b) Banks‟ asset management can 
benefit from synergies and scale economies associated with managing entrusted funds 
(Boot, 2003).  
2) Fees and commissions from annuity sales (Annuities).  
As pointed out by Boot (2003), annuity sales are similar to savings products that banks 
produce jointly to make more use of their expertise in asset management. By using 
these products, clients establish a long-run relationship and provide banks with stable 
funding. This financial resource is also likely to enhance bank‟s position in lending.  
3) Underwriting income from insurance and reinsurance activities and income from other 
insurance activities (Insurance). 
Insurance income provides banks with financial resources (a pool of premiums) under 
management that may be used partly in lending. Nevertheless, the nature of risk in this 
                                                 
6
 Due to a lack of sufficient data, we are unable to take into account income from other activities such as venture 
capital and securitization activities. Because we focus primarily on lending we do not analyze other items of non-
interest income which are not expected to expand the scope of clients‟ relationships, such as other asset sales.  
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business requires specific asset management skills that likely limits synergies with 
credit products. Banks that have more general insurance business are likely to be 
aware of the items insured – autos, residential and commercial property, other high 
value goods – that may require re-financing in the future and therefore can suggest 
lending opportunities. However, offering both lending and insurance services to the 
same clients may lead to weakening lending standards. This is particularly important 
for smaller banks where the interplay between lending and other businesses is more 
pronounced. 
4) Investment banking, advisory, and underwriting fees and commissions (Investment 
Banking) 
Existing studies (Bharath et al. 2007) show that previous lending relationships 
facilitate investment banking activity. Investment banking can further improve banks‟ 
position in lending by providing access to proprietary information. Nevertheless, this 
potential positive impact might be cancelled out by the associated agency problem 
and/or loss of focus caused by activity diversification.   
5) Net servicing fees (Loan Servicing)7. 
In undertaking loan-servicing activities banks may underprice mortgage loans and/or 
target borrowers less likely to make timely instalments so as to boost fees (Wagner, 
2009). Servicers can also collect soft information and identify borrowers who regularly 
fulfil their repayment obligations and this information can be used by banks for 
„improved‟ future loan origination. Given these two conflicting views, the relationship 
between Loan Servicing and lending quality is undetermined prior to estimation. 
6) Net gains (losses) on sales of loans and leases (Loan Sale). 
                                                 
7
 Servicing companies typically receive a percentage of the outstanding amount of the loans they service. 
Normally, they do not own the loans. Services include statements, impounds, collections, tax reporting, and other 
requirements. Any person with a mortgage loan pays her scheduled instalments to a loan-servicing firm. Most 
mortgages (known as conforming mortgages) are backed by Federal housing programs such as Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. 
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Access to market funding through the sale of loans may depend on reputation in loan 
monitoring and screening. Therefore, banks have to build a record in lending (a sort of 
certification effect) before entering into these areas. However, a strong presence in the 
market and ability to sell the loans easily may encourage banks to invest less in loan 
monitoring (Parlour and Plantin, 2008) that could lead to a deterioration in loan quality 
(Purnannandam 2010).  
7) Service charges include charges on deposit accounts in domestic offices, income and 
fees from the printing and sale of checks, income and fees from automated teller 
machines and bank card and credit card interchange fees (Service Charge).  
Service Charge can represent the volume of transactions with clients and how much 
income can be obtained from such transactions. Banks with greater income from these 
services might have clients that are more financially active, or they could be exerting 
market power charging higher fees. Lower service charges, again, may be a 
consequence of limited account activity or may reflect cross-subsidization where lower 
fees are charged to attract loans at higher spreads.   
We also include income from 8) securities brokerage in our models. The aim is to 
analyze the implications for credit risk and spread resulting from variation in the 
aforementioned non-interest activities.  
2.3. CONTROL VARIABLES 
The ratio of equity capital to total assets (Capital) is controlled for in both models. On 
the one hand, higher Capital is associated with lower moral hazard problems and better 
capitalized banks have greater monitoring incentives (Berger et al., 1995, and Keeley and 
Furlong, 1990). On the other hand, an increase in equity capital encourages risk-taking 
behavior (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988 and Blum, 1999 among 
others). Capital represents equity-holders‟ risk preferences (McShane and Sharpe, 1985 and 
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Maudos and De Guevara, 2004) and banks with a higher capital ratio may require a greater 
spread to compensate for the higher cost of equity compared to debt finance.  
We include the ratio of the face value of unused credit lines and loan commitments to 
total assets (Loan Commitment) in our analysis. Borrowers of banks with higher Loan 
Commitment face, on average, lower liquidity shocks and have the capacity to be more 
leveraged. As such, we expect a negative relationship between Loan Commitment and Credit 
Risk. Berg, Saunders and Steffen (2016) show that credit lines act as insurance for borrowers 
against liquidity shocks and the related fees (including commitment fees) smooth borrowing 
costs across different scenarios (namely, the presence and absence of liquidity shocks). 
Therefore, higher Loan Commitment may represent greater borrowing cost smoothing and 
lower Spread.  
We also capture heterogeneity in the credit portfolio by classifying loans into five 
groups and calculate their share in total loans: Loans secured on real estate (Real Estate 
Loans), commercial and industrial loans (C&I Loans), consumer loans (Consumer Loans), 
loans to finance agricultural production (Agricultural Loans) and other types of loans (All 
Other Loans). We consider Real Estate Loans as the benchmark and introduce the other four 
types of loans into our model
8
.  
We also control for bank size by including the logarithm of total assets (Size) in both 
models. Size can have several impacts on Credit Risk and Spread: Large and small banks have 
different business models, the former relying more heavily on non-interest activities given 
their greater capacity to benefit from diversification and scale economies (Hughes et al., 
2001). Larger banks may also hold riskier loan portfolios to benefit from safety net subsidies 
(Kane, 2010). Moreover, bigger banks mainly deal with larger and more transparent 
borrowers, while small banks are more likely to lend to small and opaque firms. Alternatively, 
                                                 
8
 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion, we control for characteristics of banks loan portfolio in our 
analysis. 
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large borrowers generally have easier access to financial markets as a substitute for bank 
lending. Hence, large banks could face higher competition, resulting in greater risk-taking and 
lower spreads.  
In our Credit Risk model (1) we control for Risk Weighted Assets, as it captures a 
number of risk factors such as borrowers‟ type and the existence of collateral (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997). We add the quarterly growth rate of gross loans (Loan Growth) to the 
Credit Risk model, since the literature shows a negative relationship between credit expansion 
and loan quality (Clair, 1992; Dell‟Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Ogura, 2006; Foos, et al., 
2010). We also include the implicit interest rate on loans (Yield on Total Loans). Setting a 
higher interest rate may increase Credit Risk. Alternatively, cheap credit may represent a 
weak marketing strategy, lax lending standards and higher Credit Risk. Credit Risk may also 
depend on the duration; hence, we consider the share of loans with maturity less than one year 
(Short-Term Loans) in the Credit Risk equation.  
In the Spread model (model 2), we control for cost inefficiency (Inefficiency), because 
less efficient banks are expected to have a higher spread to cover higher costs (Altunbas, 
Evans and Molyneux, 2001). We also introduce the ratio of liquid assets to total liabilities 
(Liquidity) into our model to capture liquidity risk and the difference between loans and 
securities with maturity over one year and liabilities with maturity more than one year divided 
by total assets as a measure of interest rate risk (Interest Rate Risk). We expect higher 
liquidity or interest rate risk to translate into higher Spread (Angbazo, 1997; Carbo and 
Rodriguez, 2007 and Saunders and Schumacher, 2000 among others). The share of core 
deposits in total liabilities (Core Deposit) is also included in Equation (2), as Spread depends 
on the structure of debt financing. We also consider salaries and employee benefits divided by 
the number of full-time equivalent employees (Wage) as a proxy for employees‟ expertise. 
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Banks with greater expertise are expected to have a higher Spread, since they are expected to 
offer more specialized and higher valued services. 
In both models, we attempt to capture time fixed effects by introducing nine year-
dummy variables for the years 2007 to 2015. Year 2016 is considered the benchmark. We also 
control for seasonal effects by including three quarter dummies, where the last quarter is set as 
the benchmark. Table A1 in the appendix outlines the variables used in our models.  
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 Our empirical investigation is based on a sample of 6,921 commercial banks domiciled 
in the U.S. The sample is constructed on a quarterly basis between 2007:Q3 and 2016:Q3, 
providing a total of 165,924 bank-quarter observations. Banks‟ financial data is collected from 
SNL, and failed banks are identified from the website of the FDIC. We exclude banks that 
have been in operation for less than three years and banks with no loans and core deposits. 
Outliers are removed from the sample by dropping up to 1% of observations on each tail that 
lie outside three standard deviation of the mean. The dropping is made in an iterative process, 
because after cutting outliers in each round, the standard deviation and therefore the domain 
of observations become smaller. The dropping is stopped when there is no observation beyond 
three standard deviations of the mean or cumulative droppings reach 1% on each tail. 
Moreover, we double-check all variables and their distributions manually to make sure that 
observations are in an acceptable range
9
.  
The U.S. banking system is dominated by small banks with a relatively different 
business model. As banks become larger their funding strategy, loan composition and income 
structure tend to change. Therefore, we split our sample into three groups: small banks with 
less than $100 million in total assets (Small Banks), medium banks with total assets between 
                                                 
9
 Thanks to an anonymous referee for detailed comments on the descriptive statistics, which we have taken into 
account in the paper. 
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$100 million and $1 billion (Medium Banks), and large commercial banks with more than $1 
billion in total assets (Large Banks). 
Table I presents the descriptive statistics for Small, Medium and Large Banks. The 
mean equality tests show a significant difference between the three groups of banks. The 
figures show that Loan Loss Provision of Medium Banks equals 0.12% which is significantly 
higher than that of Small Banks (0.08%), but lower than Large Banks (0.18%); Large Banks 
also hold on average more Non-performing Loans (2.13%) than Small and Medium Banks 
(1.57% and 1.86%, respectively).  
Spread and Cost of Fund are the highest for Small Banks (3.58% and 1.26%, 
respectively). They decrease for larger groups of banks. Small Banks also have the lowest Risk 
Weighted Assets (63.49%) and the highest Capital (11.3%). They are less exposed to the risk 
of interest rate rises. Large Banks have on average the lowest Core Deposits and Liquidity. 
They are the most efficient banks, while they pay on average the highest Wage.  
The second part of the table illustrates the characteristics of loan portfolios of banks in 
our sample. Growth Loans and Loan Commitment are the lowest for Small Banks. Loan 
composition varies across banks with different size. Medium Banks have the highest 
proportion of loans secured on real estate (Real Estate Loans). Among the three groups, Large 
Banks allocate the greatest proportion of loans to C&I Loans, whereas Agricultural Loans 
have the highest share in loan portfolio of Small Banks. Short-term Lending decreases by size 
of banks from 30.54% for Small Banks to 26.12% and 23.46% for Medium and Large Banks. 
The figures also show that smaller banks charge a higher interest rate on their loans. The 
average interest rates of loans granted by Small, Medium and Large Banks are 6.49%, 5.95% 
and 5.34%, respectively. For all groups of banks, Consumer Loans are the most expensive and 
Real Estate Loans are the cheapest.  
 [TABLE I] 
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The third part of the table depicts the income shares of non-interest activities in total 
operating income and our variables of interest, namely, Fiduciary, Annuities, Insurance, 
Investment Banking, Loan Servicing, Securities Brokerage, Loan Sale and Service Charge. 
The descriptive statistics show that the share of non-interest activities in total operating 
income of Large Banks is 20.90%, whereas the share is 14.84% and 12.32% for Medium and 
Small Banks, respectively
10
. Other than Service Charge, which is the highest for Small Banks, 
the income share of other non-interest activities follow almost a similar pattern and increase 
by banks‟ size. The income share for Fiduciary is 2.36% for Large Banks, while it is 0.61% 
and 0.04% for Medium and Small Banks. Other Non-interest Income accounts for 4.23%, 
5.15% and 7.60% of total operating income for Small, Medium and Large Banks, respectively.    
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. CREDIT RISK  
We estimate the Credit Risk model (Equation (1)) using our quarterly panel data to 
investigate whether non-interest activities have any impact on banks‟ loan quality. We apply 
the fixed effects technique with standard errors clustered at the bank level. Table II presents 
the estimation results for Small, Medium and Large Banks during the period under study.  
Column (1) illustrates the estimation of the model for Small Banks, where we find no 
significant relationship between non-interest activities and Credit Risk. Columns (2) to (7) 
present the results for Medium Banks. In column (2), we regress Loan Loss Provision as the 
Credit Risk proxy on its own lagged value and non-interest activities, namely Fiduciary, 
Annuities, Insurance, Investment Banking, Loan Servicing, Securities Brokerage, Loan Sale 
and Service Charge. We also control for year and quarter fixed effects. In the third column, 
we add Capital, Risk Weighted Assets and Size. In column (4), we aim to capture 
                                                 
10
 Stiroh (2006) quotes 23.9% as the Noninterest Income of traded BHCs operating between 1997 and 2004. 
Elyasiani and Wang (2009) report 24% as the Noninterest Income of listed BHCs operating between 2001-2005 
period. The average bank considered in their studies is larger and more diversified than the average bank studied 
in our paper.    
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heterogeneities caused by loan portfolio characteristics by adding Loan Growth, Yield on 
Total Loans, C&I Loans, Agricultural Loans, Consumer Loans, All Other Loans, Short-Term 
Loans and Loan Commitment to our model. In all specifications the results show significant 
and negative coefficients for Fiduciary implying that income from this business appears to 
lower Credit Risk. The result is also economically meaningful. A one percent increase, 
evaluated at the mean, in the income share of Fiduciary in total net operating income lowers 
Loan Loss Provision on average by 0.004%. The average Loan Loss Provision is 0.12%, so 
the effects are economically significant and equal to a 3.33 percent (=
      
     
) fall on average 
Loan Loss Provision. 
We carry out a set of robustness checks. In column (5), we use a panel data setting and 
estimate our model using lagged values of all right-hand-side variables and find a similar 
result for Fiduciary. Moreover, we scale the non-interest income items by total assets in lieu 
of total net operating income and re-estimate our model. The results are reported in column 
(6) and in-line with our previous findings: Fiduciary negatively affects Credit Risk. Column 
(7) shows the result when we use Non-performing Loan as the alternative proxy for Credit 
Risk in lieu of Loan Loss Provision. The result supports our finding for Fiduciary. As a 
further robustness check and following Thompson (2011)
11
, we cluster the standard errors by 
quarter and find similar results
12
. We also consider Loan Growth as an endogenous variable, 
because it can be influenced by the riskiness of existing loans
13
. We address this endogeneity 
problem using the two stage least squares technique and employing the second, third, fourth 
and fifth lags of Loan Growth as instruments. The result in the first step shows that the 
                                                 
11
 Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) both claim that when the dimensions of panel are extremely 
unbalanced, there is no need to double cluster at all; however, the former believes that single-clustering on the 
more frequent dimension (bank in our case) is almost identical to clustering by both dimensions, whereas the 
latter argues that in this case, single-clustering on the less frequent dimension (time in our case) removes the 
bias.  
12
 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request. 
13
 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for underscoring this important point. 
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instruments are strong and relevant (the null hypothesis that they are jointly zero is strongly 
rejected) and hence the model does not suffer from the weak instrument problem. In the 
second stage, we find that the negative link between Fiduciary and Credit Risk persists
14
. 
Overall, the outcome implies that income from Fiduciary appears to lower Credit Risk for 
Medium Banks.  
Among the control variables, we find that Credit Risk is positively linked to increases 
in Risk-Weighted Assets (unsurprisingly), Size and Short-Term Loans. Loan Growth, Yield on 
Total Loans, Consumer Loans and Loan Commitment are associated with lower Credit Risk. 
We also estimate our model for Large Banks. The result is presented in column (8) and shows 
no significant relationship between Credit Risk and our variables of interest. 
[TABLE II] 
We also study the relationship between non-interest activities and Credit Risk for two 
important groups of banks, - systemically important banks which we define as commercial 
banks with total assets more than $50 billion as (Systemically Important Banks)
15
 and 
distressed banks. We define the latter as banks that failed during their last 12 quarters of 
operation. The results show no relationship between non-interest activities and Credit Risk
16
. 
4.2. SPREAD  
In this sub-section, we investigate the relationship between non-interest activities 
(Fiduciary, Annuities, Insurance, Investment Banking, Loan Servicing, Securities Brokerage, 
Loan Sale and Service Charge) and Spread, in particular, we are interested in studying 
possible cross-subsidization between the two sources of income. We use the fixed effects 
technique with standard errors clustered at the bank level. Moreover, we scale revenue from 
                                                 
14
 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request. 
15
 For simplicity, we merely consider size to define Systemically Important Banks. The $50 billion threshold is 
based on the Federal Reserve Boards proposed rules to define “significant” firms issued on February 11, 2011: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20110208a.htm. 
16
 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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non-interest activities by total assets instead of total operating income, because the latter 
includes net interest income, which is affected by Spread and thereby may display a spurious 
relationship between Spread and non-interest income items
17
. Table III presents the estimation 
results of Equation (2) using quarterly data of Small, Medium and Large Banks. 
The first column reports the result for the Small Banks sub-sample. We find no 
evidence of cross-subsidization between non-interest activities and the lending-borrowing 
spread. Indeed, we observe that Spread is positively associated with Insurance and Service 
Charge. Banks with higher service charges have higher spreads – so this shows that there is 
no cross-subsidization in pricing – such a finding reflects pricing power emanating from 
brand strength (higher quality services earn higher spreads and fees) or market power (or a 
combination of both).  The results also show that better capitalized banks have a higher 
Spread. This is in-line with our expectations and the existing literature (Carbo and Rodriguez 
2007). The higher cost of equity compared to debt requires a premium for capital over the 
interest spread. Smaller banks have on average a higher Spread, which is consistent with scale 
economies and recent literature (Hughes and Mester 2013).  
Core deposits depicts a positive relationship with Spread. Core deposits represent 
banks‟ charter value, which justifies a premium on Spread. The findings support the results of 
Carbo and Rodriguez (2007). As expected Inefficiency necessitates a higher Spread. We also 
find that Spread has a positive association with Liquidity Risk and Interest Rate Risk (as also 
found by Angbazo 1997; Saunders and Schumacher 2000; Carbo and Rodriguez 2007). 
Columns (2) & (3) illustrate the regression results for Medium Banks. In column (2), 
we estimate the Spread model. We find a positive coefficient for Annuities, Insurance and 
Service Charge. The result also shows a negative association between Loan Sale and Spread. 
Since mortgage loans are more easily saleable in the market, banks that are more active in 
                                                 
17
 In the Spread model, we also define Inefficiency as the ratio of non-interest expense divided by total assets in 
lieu of total operating income. 
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loan sales may charge lower interest on Real Estate Loans. Therefore, in column (3), we use 
Yield on Real Estate Loans as the dependent variable
18
. We find no significant relationship 
between Yield on Real Estate Loans and Loan Sale. However, we do find some evidence to 
support cross-subsidization between fiduciary and loans secured on real estate.  
In columns (4) to (9), we study Large Banks. In column (4), similar to Small and 
Medium Banks, we observe a positive association between Service Charge and Spread. We 
also find that Spread is negatively correlated with Fiduciary and Loan Sale. In order to 
examine whether a lower Spread of banks with a higher Fiduciary is driven by a higher 
funding cost or a lower loan interest rates, in columns (5) & (6), we use Cost of Fund and 
Yield on Total Loans, respectively, as the dependent variable. We find a significantly negative 
relationship between Fiduciary and Yield on Total Loans. The results also show that 
Securities Brokerage and Loan Sale are negatively correlated with both Cost of Fund and 
Yield on Total Loans. The link is stronger for Loan Sale. In columns (7) to (9), we use Yield 
on Real Estate, Yield on C&I Loans and Yield on Consumer Loans, respectively, as the 
dependent variable to further explore the cross-subsidization between non-interest activities 
and lending. We do not find a significant relationship between Fiduciary and our dependent 
variables despite our finding on the Yield on Total Loans model. However, we find that banks 
with a higher income on Loan Sale charge a lower rate on Real Estate Loans. Moreover, 
banks with a higher income share from Investment Banking or Securities Brokerage tend to 
charge a lower interest rate on C&I Loans and Consumer Loans. The results also display a 
negative correlation between Loan Servicing and Real Estate Loans.  
Overall, we find some evidence to support the cross-subsidization conjecture driven 
mainly by Medium and Large Banks’ lending secured on real estate and various non-interest 
activities such as Fiduciary, Loan Sale, Loan Servicing and Investment Banking. We also find 
                                                 
18
 In this specification, we exclude the variables representing composition of loan portfolio and Loan 
Commitment. 
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that an increase in Service Charge is associated with an increase in Spread, which suggest that 
banks do not follow a loss-leader strategy in servicing depositors.  
 [TABLE III] 
4.3. PROFIT COMPLEMENTARITIES
19
  
The linkage between non-interest activities and lending may be due to informational or 
profit synergies. In this section we investigate whether pair-wise profit complementarity exists 
between lending and non-interest activities that might contribute to joint production
20
. As 
such, we examine whether the marginal profit of producing loans increases when they are 
generated jointly with non-interest activities
21
.  
 In a multi-product firm pair-wise profit complementarity (PPC) between two products 
exists when an increase in product A increases the marginal profit of producing product B
22
. 
                                                 
19
 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion, we examine profit synergies. 
20
 Informational synergy analysis requires detailed data on clients‟ relationship which are not available.  
21
 We follow Berger and Mester (1997) and set-up the following multi-product alternative profit function with a 
trans-logarithmic functional form (Berndt and Christensen, 1973): 
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Wherein: TP = the total profit defined as net income before income taxes and discontinued operations. Y is the 
output vector consisting of: Y1 = Net loans and leases; Y2 = securities plus federal funds sold, securities 
purchased under agreements to resell and other investments; Y3 = total nominal value of off-balance sheet items; 
Y4 = the income from the non-interest activities (Fiduciary, Annuities, Insurance, Investment Banking, Loan 
Servicing and Securities Brokerage); Y5 = the income from service charges on deposit accounts. 
W is the input price vector comprising: W1 = salary expenses divided by the number of full-time equivalent 
employees; W2 = expenses of premises and fixed assets divided by total fixed assets; W3 = total interest expense 
divided by interest-bearing liabilities.  
Z = the total capital equity. Z is added to the model to control for unmeasured cost of equity capital. Banks with 
higher equity capital have higher profit as they have less debt financing and hence interest expense, assuming all 
other factors equal (Hughes and Mester, 2013). 
We also impose input price homogeneity restrictions and symmetry assumptions. Since it is not possible to take 
logarithms of negative numbers, we replace negative total profit (loss) with one and include a variable in the 
right-hand-side of the equation that takes the value one when total profit is positive and equals the absolute value 
of the loss, when total profit is negative.  
22
 This is similar to cost complementarity discussed in Clark (1988). In this paper we study profit 
complementarity, because several studies highlight the importance of profit maximization vis-a-vis cost 
minimization (Berger et al. 2004 among others), as profit is a broader indicator of corporate‟s performance and is 
more aligned with managerial objectives.  
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We can then write the measure of pair-wise profit complementarity (PPC) between products A 
and B as follows: 
   (     )   
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)  [
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)]                                       ( ) 
PPC > 0 implies the existence of profit complementarity between products A and B.  
PPC = 0 implies non-jointness or an absence of profit complementarities.   
PPC < 0 implies diseconomies of joint production. The necessary condition (NC) for 
diseconomies of joint production (PPC<0) is:    
      
          
                                                           
(4) 
 Table IV illustrates the empirical results on profit complementarity between non-
interest activities and lending (Y1 & Y4) for Small, Medium and Large Banks. In this analysis, 
non-interest income consists of income from Fiduciary, Annuities, Insurance, Loan Servicing, 
Securities Brokerage and Investment Banking. Service charges on deposits accounts are 
classified as a separate output (Y5). Income from loan sales is excluded from the model. 
Moreover, we exclude the crisis period in this analysis. Small, Medium and Large Banks are 
studied in panels (A), (B) & (C), respectively.  
 In the first column, we define the profit function based on the intermediation approach 
(Berger and Mester, 1997 among others) and estimate it using the fixed effects technique
23
. In 
panel (A), the first two rows display marginal profit of Y1 & Y4 for Small Banks. The 
marginal profit of loans and non-interest income are about 0.12% and 36.79%, respectively. 
The substantial difference between the marginal profits of loans and non-interest activities is 
due to the fact that lending is measured in the model by the volume of loans, whereas non-
interest activities are represented by the net income of such businesses. In the third row, the 
result shows the necessary condition for diseconomies of joint production is fulfilled. The 
                                                 
23
 We do not use the stochastic frontier approach, because in most cases we encounter estimation convergence 
problems. 
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fourth row depicts the result on pair-wise profit complementarity suggesting diseconomies of 
joint production. The impact is economically small. A one percent increase from the mean in 
non-interest income equals a 0.292% (0.292%=1%×14.28×
          
      
) fall in the marginal 
profit of loans.  
[TABLE IV] 
 As a robustness check, we follow the production approach (Berger and DeYoung, 1997 
among others) and include transaction deposits in our model as a further output. The results 
are presented in the second column. The marginal profit of both loans and non-interest income 
decreases, because in the production approach total profit is shared among more products. The 
result on the third row shows that the necessary condition for diseconomies of joint production 
of non-interest activities and loans is realized, which is in-line with our findings under the 
intermediation approach. In the fourth row, we observe that the sufficiency condition is also 
fulfilled and the measure of profit complementarity suggests diseconomies of joint production. 
The economic magnitude is small and slightly higher than that of the intermediation approach. 
A one percent increase from the mean in non-interest income equals a 0.356% decrease in the 
marginal profit of loans.  
Panel (B) reports our results for Medium Banks. The results on the first column using 
the intermediation approach show that the marginal profit of loans and non-interest activities 
are on average lower compared to Small Banks. We find that the necessary condition for 
diseconomies of joint production is achieved, whereas the sufficient condition is not fulfilled, 
because the measure of profit complementarity, displayed in the fourth row, predicts 
economies of joint production. The economic magnitude is tiny. A one percent increase from 
the mean in non-interest income equals a 0.028% (0.292%=1%×101×
           
       
) increase in 
the marginal profit of loans. The second column illustrates the results for the production 
approach. In row (3), we find that contrary to the intermediation approach, the necessary 
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condition for diseconomies of joint production is not realized. Row (4) reports the measure of 
profit complementarity which suggests scope economies between non-interest income and 
lending. The economic magnitude is larger compared to the intermediation approach; yet it is 
tiny. A one percent increase from the mean in non-interest income equals a 0.041% increase 
in the marginal profit of loans. 
Panel (C) displays our results for Large Banks. The first column exhibits our results 
when we follow the intermediation approach. Column (2) reports the outcome using the 
production approach. In both columns, we find that the marginal profit of loans is higher, but 
the marginal profit of non-interest activities is lower on average compared to Small and 
Medium Banks. The results show that the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
diseconomies of joint production are realized, because both NC and PPC are negative. The 
economic magnitude is tiny and smaller than that of Small Banks. A one percent increase from 
the mean in non-interest income equals a 0.029% decrease in the marginal profit of loans 
under both the intermediation and production approaches.  
As further analysis, we limit the sample of Large Banks to banks with $1 to $10 billion 
total assets
24
. The results predict diseconomy of joint production. The economic magnitude 
becomes smaller, namely 0.008%, under the intermediation approach; however, it is almost 
unchanged under the production approach
25
.  
Overall, our findings suggest profit complementarity of joint production of loans and 
non-interest activities for Medium Banks. We find evidence for diseconomies of joint 
production for both Small and Large Banks. The joint production is less harmful for Large 
Banks, whereas Small can suffer the most from diseconomies of joint production.  
                                                 
24
 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request. 
25
 We also study banks with $10 to $50 billion total assets and those with total assets more than $50 billion. The 
results on these two groups are not statistically reliable, for instance for the former group, we find a negative 
marginal profit for loans and for the latter group, the results substantially vary between the intermediation and 
the production approaches. 
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4.4. FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
4.4.1. Crisis and Post-Crisis Periods 
In sections 4.1 & 4.2 we find a robust negative relationship between fiduciary 
activities and Medium Banks‟ credit risk and Large Banks’ lending-borrowing spread. As a 
further analysis, in this sub-section, we explore the relationship between Fiduciary, Credit 
Risk and Spread during the global financial crisis and afterwards. Table V presents the results 
of our analysis using quarterly data of Medium and Large Banks. In all specifications, instead 
of year dummies, we include Crisis, a dummy that takes the value one for the crisis period, 
namely 2007-Q3:2009:Q2
26
, and zero otherwise. We also add the interaction term of 
Fiduciary and Crisis to our models. 
Columns (1) & (2) illustrate the estimation of the Credit Risk Model (Equation (1)). In 
the first column, Fiduciary shows a negative relationship with Credit Risk in the post-crisis 
period, (when Crisis takes the value zero), whereas the coefficient of the interaction term 
takes a positive sign. The F-test for the significance of the summation of the two coefficients 
shows that the relationship between Fiduciary and Credit Risk - even though it is weaker - 
remains significant during the crisis. In the second column, we study Large Banks and find no 
significant relationship between Fiduciary and Credit Risk during both crisis and post-crisis 
periods.  
[TABLE V] 
Columns (3) and (4) display the results for the Spread Model (Equation (2)) for 
Medium and Large Banks, respectively. In column (3), we find a significantly negative 
relationship between Fiduciary and Spread in the post-crisis period. However, the interaction 
term has a positive coefficient, and the result of the F-test of significance of the summation 
shows that its magnitude is substantial enough to wipe out the negative link between 
                                                 
26
 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the US recession ended in June 2009 
(http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). 
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Fiduciary and Spread, and predicts no significant relationship during the crisis period. In 
column (4), contrary to our findings for Medium Banks, we observe that the negative 
relationship between Fiduciary and Spread for Large Banks persists during the crisis period.     
Overall, the results show that Fiduciary lost its predictive power during the crisis 
period. This is in-line with empirical banking literature which shows that relationships that 
hold in normal times tend to change during crisis periods (e.g. Beltratti and Stulz 2012; De 
Jonghe and Öztekin 2015; Berger et al. 2016). 
4.4.2. Franchise Value Model
27
 
 So far we find that fiduciary activities lower banks‟ credit risk. One plausible channel 
for explaining this finding is via banks‟ franchise value. In commercial banking, relationships 
with customers form a core part of intangible assets known as franchise or charter value 
(Boot, 2017). Non-interest activities can widen and stimulate such relationships by attracting 
new clients and increasing the scope of interactions with existing customers. Therefore, in this 
sub-section, we explore the relationship between non-interest activities and franchise value. 
We adopt the following model based on De Jonghe and Vennet (2008):  
Franchise_Valuei,t = λ0 + ∑     
 
   ×Non-interest_Income_Activitiesk,i,t + λ2×Credit_Riski,t + 
λ3×Inefficiencyi,t + λ4×Core_Depositi,t + λ5×Capitali,t + λ6×Sizei,t +  
∑                   
    
       + ∑                      
 
    + µi,t        (5) 
 
Where individual banks and the time dimension are represented by i and t subscripts, 
respectively. We use market to book value of equity capital (Market to Book Value) as a 
proxy for franchise value (Franchise Value). Variations in Franchise Value are modelled in 
Equation (5) as a function of non-interest activities and a set of controls. We control for 
Credit Risk, Inefficiency, Core Deposit, Capital and Size. Banks with a higher credit risk and 
inefficiency are expected to have lower franchise value. Core deposits are a stable source of 
funding representing clients‟ relationships and are expected to increase franchise value. We 
                                                 
27
 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion, we estimate a Franchise Value Model. 
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also control for capital strength using the equity capital to assets ratio, because banks with less 
capital are likely to be more risky and hence are expected to have a lower franchise value. We 
also control for size of banks in our model and predict a positive relationship between size and 
franchise value. Finally, we include year and quarter dummy variables to capture year and 
quarter fixed effects.  
We estimate the Franchise Value model (Equation (5)) using 1,840 quarterly panel 
data on listed Medium Banks. Table VI presents the estimation results. In the first column, we 
estimate our model using fixed effects techniques. The result shows that Franchise Value is 
positively correlated with Fiduciary and Loan Servicing. We also find that banks with a 
higher Credit Risk or Inefficiency have on average lower Franchise Value.  
In columns (2) – (5), we examine the robustness of our results. In the second column, 
we follow Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) and cluster standard errors at both bank and 
quarter levels, because the dimensions of our panel data are not extremely unbalanced toward 
either of the two dimensions. In column (3), we use the lagged value of right-hand-side 
variables to address potential endogeneity of explanatory variables. In both specifications, the 
results on Fiduciary and Loan Servicing remain unchanged. In column (4), we adopt a 
dynamic panel setting for our model to deal with omitted-variable bias following Wooldridge 
(2016 p. 283) and find that the positive and significant relationship of Franchise Value and 
Fiduciary persists, while the significant coefficient of Loan Servicing and Franchise Value 
disappears. In column (5), we scale non-interest income items by total assets to control for 
possible impacts caused by variation in total operating income. The result is in-line with 
previous findings. There is a robust and significantly positive relationship between Fiduciary 
and Franchise Value.  
 [TABLE VI] 
4.4.3. Self-selection Model 
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We find a negative relationship between income share of fiduciary activities and credit 
risk; however, it could be argued that factors behind fiduciary income might also explain the 
lower level of credit risk. To control for this endogeneity issue in identifying the impact of 
fiduciary activities on credit risk, we follow Campa and Kedia (2002) and Laeven and Levine 
(2007) and use Heckman‟s (1979) two-step procedure for estimation of self-selection models.  
We define a dummy variable that takes the value one for banks with fiduciary income, 
and zero otherwise (Fiduciary Dummy) and model banks‟ decision for providing fiduciary 
services as a function of a set of bank characteristics and estimate the relationships using a 
probit model:  
Fiduciary_Dummyi,t  = f(θXit) = f(θ0 + θ1×Risk_Weighted_Assetsi,t + θ2×Inefficiencyi,t +  
                                      θ3×Core_Depositsi,t + θ4×Capitali,t + θ5×Sizei,t +  
                                      ∑                   
    
       + ∑                      
 
   )           (6) 
 
We also define Credit Risk as a function of the Fiduciary Dummy and the control 
variables described in Equation (1) (“Controls”).  
Credit_Riski,t = δ0 + δ1×Credit_Riski,t-1 + δ2×Fiduciary_Dummy,i,t + ∑     
  
   ×Controlsk,i,t + ʋi,t      (7) 
 
The expected Credit Risk conditional on having fiduciary income is estimated as 
follows: 
E(Credit_Riski,t | Fiduciary_Dummyi,t = 1) = δ0 + δ1×Credit_Riski,t-1 + δ2 + ∑     
  
   ×Controlsk,i,t +  
                                                                         E(ʋi,t | Fiduciary_Dummyi,t = 1)                                  (8) 
 
Under the assumption that the error terms in Equations (6) and (7) have bivariate 
normal distributions with means equals zero, standard deviations of 1 and σʋ, and correlation 
ρ, we can write E(ʋi,t | Fiduciary_Dummyi,t = 1) = ρσʋλ1(θXit), where λ1(θXit) = 
 (    )
 (    )
,  ( ) and 
 ( ) are respectively the probability density and the cumulative distribution functions of the 
standard normal. The expected Credit Risk conditional on having no fiduciary income is 
estimated as follows: 
E(Credit_Riski,t | Fiduciary_Dummyi,t = 0) = δ0 + δ1×Credit_Riski,t-1 + ∑     
  
   ×Controlsk,i,t +  
                                                                        E(ʋi,t | Fiduciary_Dummyi,t = 0)                                   (9) 
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Based on the previous assumptions, we have E(ʋi,t | Fiduciary_Dummyi,t = 0) = ρσʋλ2(θXit), 
where λ2(θXit) = 
  (    )
   (    )
. To control for factors that lead to choosing fiduciary business, in 
the first step we estimate Equation (6) using a probit model and calculate λ1 and λ2. In the 
second step, we estimate Equation (7), after adding the corrections for the self-selection issue. 
Credit_Riski,t = δ0 + δ1×Credit_Riski,t-1 + δ2×Fiduciary_Dummyi,t + δλ[  ( ̂   )   Fiduciary_Dummyit 
+   ( ̂   )   (1 - Fiduciary_Dummyit)] + ∑     
  
   ×Controlsk,i,t + ʋi,t       
                      = δ0 + δ1×Credit_Riski,t-1 + δ2×Fiduciary_Dummyi,t + δλλ + 
                         ∑     
  
   ×Controlsk,i,t + ʋi,t                                                                                        (10) 
 
The sign of δλ is the same as the sign of correlation of the error terms in Equations (6) 
and (7). For instance, a negative coefficient indicates that factors that encourage banks to 
provide fiduciary services are negatively correlated with credit risk. 
We estimate our sample selection model
28
; overall, the analysis shows that even after 
controlling for self-selection issues, fiduciary activities do lead to a fall in Credit Risk
29
.  
The result of estimation of Equation (6) - not reported here - show that banks with 
lower Inefficiency and higher Core Deposits are more likely to have fiduciary income. It can 
be argued that the negative relationship between Fiduciary and Credit Risk is due to omission 
of these two variables from the Credit Risk model (Equation (1)), because higher efficiency or 
more core deposits funding can both lower Credit Risk and attract more fiduciary services. In 
order to address this concern, we include Inefficiency and Core Deposits into the Credit Risk 
model and re-estimate it. Similar to our previous findings, the results show that an increase in 
income share of Fiduciary is associated with a decline in Credit Risk
30
. 
4.4.4. Sub-sampling Based on Fiduciary Income  
                                                 
28
 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request. 
29
 Using a similar approach, we examine the relationship between fiduciary and overall risk, proxied by the 
standard deviation of return on assets, and how it might be affected when we control for possible sample 
selection bias. The results show that the negative correlation between Fiduciary Dummy and overall risk of 
Medium Banks persists even after adding Lambda to the model.  
30
 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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It could be argued that banks offering fiduciary services may be different from those 
without such income and the negative relationship between Fiduciary and Credit Risk is 
driven by such differences in bank type. We address this concern, by restricting the sample to 
Medium Banks with fiduciary income and re-estimate our Credit Risk model (Equation (1)). 
The results are in-line with our previous findings and show a robust and significantly negative 
relationship between Fiduciary and Credit Risk
31
.   
5. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper analyses the impact of non-interest activities on banks' lending in terms of 
credit quality and spread. Agency problems and a potential loss of focus associated with 
diversification into non-interest businesses may cause deterioration in loan quality. 
Alternatively, expanding client relationships can improve the quality of banks' credit by 
providing relatively stable financial resources, more soft information, greater cross-selling 
opportunities and (ultimately) improved franchise value. Banks with a wider scope of 
relationships are able to reach more potential borrowers. Moreover, non-interest earnings may 
also influence banks' interest spread through possible cross-subsidization effects. Post-crisis 
banks have had to strengthen their capital positions by de-risking their operations – by both 
choice and legal mandate (Dodd-Frank). This has particularly occurred in non-traditional 
banking areas – such as investment banking and securities business. It is interesting to see 
how loan pricing and risk has responded to these developments and in particular to see if (as 
previous literature has found for broader bank risks) if diversification in non-traditional areas 
typically results in a heightened risk appetite for commercial banks, or if there has been any 
risk-shifting from non-traditional to traditional banking business areas. 
Using quarterly data on 6,921 U.S. commercial banks between 2007:Q3 and 2016:Q3 
we show that an increase in the income share from fiduciary activities in total operating 
                                                 
31
 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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income lowers credit risk for banks with total assets ranging between $100 million and $1 
billion. The impact is more pronounced during the post-crisis period. We find for all bank 
sizes no evidence that other non-interest activities adversely affect loan quality. We also find 
no link between non-interest activities and credit risk for systemically important banks 
(greater than $50bn in assets), or even distressed banks.   
In addition, we find some evidence in support of cross-subsidization in particular for 
Large Banks (more than $1bn total assets). Their loan servicing and loan sales income is 
negatively associated with interest rates on secured loans. Moreover, Large Banks with a 
higher investment banking income tend to charge lower rates on C&I and consumer loans. 
Contrary to the aforementioned non-interest activities, income from service charges appears to 
be positively linked to spread suggestive of pricing market power on loans and other services.  
We investigate whether pair-wise profit complementarity or alternatively 
(dis)economies of joint production exist between lending and non-interest activities. Our 
analysis provides evidence to support the existence of profit complementarity and scope 
economies for banks with assets ranging between $100 million and $1 billion, whereas other 
banks in particular small banks (with assets less than $100 million) actually suffer from 
diseconomies of joint production.  
One can surmise that the very smallest banks – under $100mn, that suffer from 
diseconomies of scope, are in no position to take on more non-interest activities as this 
reduces profits. Larger banks (greater than $1bn) appear to cross-subsidize lending from their 
non-interest activities – for instance C&I and other loan rates are lower for banks that earn 
more investment banking income. It seems likely that types of credit and lending technologies 
of banks in the $100mn to $1bn range produce more synergies with non-interest activities in 
particular fiduciary services and differ from those of bigger banks. Smaller banks have less 
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opportunity or are unwilling to cross subsidize non-interest activities due to size, operational 
constraints or less competitive pressure in pricing relationship loans.  
From a policy and commercial perspective there appears to be diversification benefits 
derived from combining lending and non-interest activities in particular fiduciary business (at 
least for banks in the $100mn to $1bn asset size range) so regulators should seek to introduce 
rules / incentives that encourage this business combination as it can potentially mitigate credit 
risk problems. Also perhaps antitrust regulators may be further interested in investigating why 
banks with high spreads also have high service charges. 
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics 
This table illustrates general descriptive statistics of U.S. commercial banks for the period of 2007:Q3-2016:Q3. Small Banks are defined as commercial banks with total assets below $100 
million. Medium Banks are commercial banks with total assets between $100 million and $1 billion. Large Banks are defined as commercial banks with total assets above $1 billion. 
      Small Banks   Medium Banks       Large Banks     
 
Variable 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
 
T-Stat.
†
 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
 
T-Stat.
§
 
G
en
er
al
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
Total Assets (mil. $) 
 
54,508 58 24 5 100 
 
96,822 294 199 100 1,000 
 
-364*** 
 
14,594 8,223 24,975 1,000 291,824 
 
-38.4*** 
Loan Loss Provision (%) 
 
54,508 0.08 0.18 -0.55 1.79 
 
96,822 0.12 0.21 -0.62 2 
 
-39.0*** 
 
14,594 0.18 0.3 -0.85 2.69 
 
-23.3*** 
Non-performing Loans (%) 
 
54,508 1.57 1.91 0 12.63 
 
96,822 1.86 2.08 0 15.34 
 
-27.5*** 
 
14,594 2.13 2.28 0 16.98 
 
-13.5*** 
Spread (%) 
 
54,508 3.58 0.71 1.29 5.94 
 
96,822 3.55 0.61 1.55 5.69 
 
8.3*** 
 
14,594 3.4 0.65 0.7 8.34 
 
26.2*** 
Cost of Fund (%) 
 
54,508 1.26 0.94 0.07 4.23 
 
96,822 1.17 0.91 0.07 4.17 
 
18.1*** 
 
14,594 1.01 0.92 0.06 4.28 
 
19.6*** 
Risk Weighted Assets (%) 
 
54,508 63.48 13.2 22.35 105.03 
 
96,822 69.31 11.82 32.7 106.45 
 
-85.6*** 
 
14,594 73.57 11.42 35.07 110.19 
 
-41.8*** 
Capital (%) 
 
54,508 11.3 3.19 1.26 25.87 
 
96,822 10.4 2.28 3.1 20.54 
 
58.0*** 
 
14,594 10.71 2.53 2.79 22.91 
 
-14.0*** 
Core Deposits (%) 
 
54,508 90.44 9.32 51.25 100 
 
96,822 87.67 10.77 39.43 100 
 
52.4*** 
 
14,594 85.89 12.62 4.92 100.00 
 
16.2*** 
Liquidity (%) 
 
54,508 33.18 17.62 1.02 88.3 
 
96,822 23.88 13.29 1.01 70.16 
 
107*** 
 
14,594 17.77 10.62 1.17 67.53 
 
62.5*** 
Inefficiency (%) 
 
54,508 74.77 18.29 16.85 197.97 
 
96,822 69.53 15.45 17.96 171.03 
 
56.5*** 
 
14,594 64.45 13.3 18.33 147.61 
 
42.1*** 
Interest Rate Risk (%) 
 
54,508 46.28 14.4 0.13 90.99 
 
96,822 48.44 13.73 2.87 90.23 
 
-28.5*** 
 
14,594 48.22 14.41 0.07 85.66 
 
1.7*** 
Wage (thou. $) 
 
54,508 58.32 15 14 126 
 
96,822 64.5 17 12 142 
 
-73.3*** 
 
14,594 76.35 24.7 3 221.00 
 
-56.0*** 
Market to Book Value (%) 
 
314 79.88 33.59 21.71 201.04 
 
1,840 87.15 30.69 25.16 201.67 
 
-3.6*** 
 
395 111.99 41.28 41.43 259.36 
 
-11.3*** 
L
o
an
 P
o
rt
fo
li
o
 C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
Loan Growth (%)  54,508 0.87 4.89 -15.34 22.17   96,822 1.05 3.65 -10.84 18.69   -7.5***   14,594 1.62 4.4 -13.45 40.98   -14.9*** 
Loan Commitment (%) 
 
54,508 6.96 5.2 0 28.17 
 
96,822 9.95 5.42 0 32.02 
 
-106*** 
 
14,594 16.71 8.55 0.03 79.47 
 
-92.7*** 
Real Estate Loans (%) 
 
54,508 62.48 18.04 3.51 99.8 
 
96,822 74.84 13.25 24.44 99.93 
 
-140*** 
 
14,594 72.56 14.56 0.04 99.93 
 
17.8*** 
C&I Loans (%) 
 
54,508 13.53 8 0 46.39 
 
96,822 13.61 7.96 0 46.9 
 
-1.9* 
 
14,594 17.51 10.88 0.03 67.66 
 
-41.7*** 
Agricultural Loans (%) 
 
54,508 14.07 14.98 0 63.57 
 
96,822 5.12 8.63 0 44.93 
 
128*** 
 
14,594 1.3 2.85 0 19.89 
 
105*** 
Consumer Loans (%) 
 
54,508 8.72 6.74 0 40.86 
 
96,822 5.01 4.82 0 32.51 
 
113*** 
 
14,594 5.16 7.25 0 58.17 
 
-2.4*** 
All Other Loans (%) 
 
54,508 1.2 2.08 0 15.27 
 
96,822 1.42 2.1 0 17.23 
 
-19.7*** 
 
14,594 3.47 4.53 0 42.59 
 
-53.8*** 
Short-Term Loans (%) 
 
54,508 30.54 13.9 0 78.1 
 
96,822 26.12 12.71 0 70.14 
 
61.2*** 
 
14,594 23.46 12.97 0 94.99 
 
23.2*** 
Yield on Total Loans (%) 
 
54,508 6.49 1.03 3.44 9.97 
 
96,822 5.95 0.93 3.05 9.31 
 
101*** 
 
14,594 5.34 1 2.11 10.71 
 
69.3*** 
Yield on Real Estate Loans (%) 
 
54,508 6.31 1.03 3.09 9.93 
 
96,822 5.87 0.92 2.98 9.07 
 
82.8*** 
 
14,594 5.33 0.98 2.44 9.55 
 
62.5*** 
Yield on C&I Loans (%) 
 
54,508 6.71 1.77 1.21 16.22 
 
96,822 6.15 1.48 1.52 13.23 
 
62.6*** 
 
14,594 5.41 1.51 0.48 14.15 
 
55.3*** 
Yield on Consumer Loans (%) 
 
54,508 8.11 2.11 1.41 18.93 
 
96,822 7.67 2.24 0.61 19.21 
 
38.1*** 
 
14,594 6.85 2.58 0.67 21.62 
 
36.4*** 
N
o
n
-i
n
te
re
st
 A
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
Non-interest Income (%)  54,508 12.32 6.35 -11.83 50.46   96,822 14.84 7.76 -18.02 58.32   -68.3***   14,594 20.9 10.35 -19.03 71.89   -67.9*** 
Fiduciary (%) 
 
54,508 0.04 0.3 0 4.62 
 
96,822 0.61 1.85 0 16.03 
 
-93.7*** 
 
14,594 2.36 3.94 0 39.65 
 
-52.8*** 
Annuities (%) 
 
54,508 0 0.02 0 0.42 
 
96,822 0.07 0.25 0 2.04 
 
-86.6*** 
 
14,594 0.21 0.37 0 1.8 
 
-44.2*** 
Insurance (%) 
 
54,508 0.34 1.22 -3.08 13.71 
 
96,822 0.28 0.93 -2.6 9.39 
 
10.0*** 
 
14,594 0.5 1.45 -2.43 11.71 
 
-17.8*** 
Investment Banking (%) 
 
54,508 0 0.02 0 0.44 
 
96,822 0.04 0.22 0 2.32 
 
-56.2*** 
 
14,594 0.19 0.58 0 4.87 
 
-30.9*** 
Loans Servicing (%) 
 
54,508 0.15 0.65 -1.82 6.22 
 
96,822 0.41 1.05 -2.77 7.99 
 
-59.4*** 
 
14,594 0.49 1.29 -3.84 12.6 
 
-7.1*** 
Securities Brokerage (%) 
 
54,508 0.02 0.12 0 1.75 
 
96,822 0.21 0.56 0 4.32 
 
-102*** 
 
14,594 0.44 0.68 0 5.15 
 
-38.9*** 
Loan Sales (%) 
 
54,508 0.41 1.89 -5.88 23.6 
 
96,822 1.64 3.98 -11.15 35.39 
 
-81.3*** 
 
14,594 2.5 4.72 -12.24 42.86 
 
-20.9*** 
Service Charges (%) 
 
54,508 7.12 4.14 0 22.26 
 
96,822 6.4 3.82 0 21.21 
 
33.4*** 
 
14,594 6.55 3.8 0 21.29 
 
-4.4*** 
Other Non-interest Income (%) 54,508 4.23 4.47 -21.89 33.33   96,822 5.15 5 -27.44 32.44   -36.8***   14,594 7.6 6.81 -23 62.09   -41.8*** 
† T-Stat. of mean equality test between Small and Medium Commercial Banks. § T-Stat. of mean equality test between Medium and Large Commercial Banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. See Table A1 for variable definitions.   
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Table II. Credit Risk Model  
   
This table reports estimations of the Credit Risk model (Equation (1)) using quarterly data of 6,921 commercial banks during 
2007:Q3-2016:Q3. Small Banks are defined as commercial banks with total assets below $100 million. Medium Banks are 
commercial banks with total assets between $100 million and $1 billion. Large Banks are defined as commercial banks with 
total assets above $1 billion. We use Loan Loss Provision as the primary proxy for Credit Risk and regress it on our variables 
of interest and a set of control variables, using the fixed effects technique with standard errors clustered at the bank level. 
In the first column, we estimate our model for Small Banks. Columns (2) to (7) illustrate the results for Medium Bank. In 
column (2) we regress Loan Loss Provision on its own lagged value and our variables of interest, i.e. Fiduciary, Annuities, 
Insurance, Investment Banking, Loan Servicing, Securities Brokerage, Loan Sale, and Service Charge. We also include year 
and quarter dummies in our estimation. In the third column, we control for Capital, Risk Weighted Assets and Size. In column 
(4), we try to capture loan portfolio heterogeneities by adding Loan Growth, Yield on Total Loans, C&I Loans, Agricultural 
Loans, Consumer Loans, All Other Loans, Short-Term Loans and Loan Commitment. In column (5), we use a panel data 
setting in lieu of dynamic panel. In this specification we use the lagged value of explanatory variables. Column (6) displays 
the estimation of our model, wherein non-interest income items are scaled by total assets. We use Non-performing Loans 
instead of Loan Loss Provision as the Credit Risk proxy in column (7). Finally, in column (8), we estimate the Credit Risk 
model for Large Banks sub-sample. Year and quarter dummies are included in the model, but not reported in the table. 
Variables 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
Small Banks  Medium Banks  Large Banks 
L. Dependent Variable (α1) 0.083***  0.212*** 0.195*** 0.173***  0.173*** 0.786***  0.329*** 
 (0.010)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.004)  (0.025) 
Fiduciary (α21) -0.003  -0.004** -0.003* -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.345*** -1.162*  0.008 
 (0.004)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.133) (0.603)  (0.006) 
Annuities (α22) -0.012  -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.165 -0.861  -0.015 
 (0.057)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.467) (1.661)  (0.014) 
Insurance (α23) -0.000  -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.060 0.182  -0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.141) (0.519)  (0.004) 
Investment Banking (α24) -0.062  0.013* 0.010 0.008 0.004 0.955 1.637  -0.011 
 (0.058)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.646) (2.221)  (0.009) 
Loan Servicing (α25) 0.000  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.147 -0.575  -0.004 
 (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.132) (0.534)  (0.003) 
Securities Brokerage (α26)  -0.005  -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.677  -0.015 
 (0.016)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.301) (1.105)  (0.009) 
Loan Sale (α27) 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.012 -0.050  -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.110)  (0.001) 
Service Charge (α28)  -0.001  -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.055 -0.150  -0.003 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.064) (0.243)  (0.003) 
Capital (α3) -0.006***   -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.000 -0.009*** 0.006  -0.010*** 
 (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)  (0.003) 
Risk Weighted Assets (α4) 0.002***   0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004***  0.003*** 
 (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Size (α5)  0.081***   0.123*** 0.111*** 0.176*** 0.110*** 0.352***  0.095*** 
 (0.013)   (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.033)  (0.023) 
Loan Growth (α6) -0.003***    -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.015***  -0.005*** 
 (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Yield on Total Loans (α7) -0.034***    -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.510***  -0.054*** 
 (0.003)    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.018)  (0.011) 
C&I Loans (α8) 0.001***    0.001** 0.001** 0.001** -0.002  -0.001 
 (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Agricultural Loans (α9) 0.001***    0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.008***  -0.003 
 (0.000)    (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.003) 
Consumer Loans (α10) 0.002***    -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.011***  -0.002 
 (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) 
All Other Loans (α11) -0.000    -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.012***  -0.003** 
 (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)  (0.001) 
Short-Term Loans (α12) 0.001***    0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*  0.002*** 
 (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Loan Commitment (α13) -0.001***    -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.013***  -0.004*** 
 (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.001) 
Constant (α0) -0.708***  0.090*** -1.524*** -1.098*** -2.047*** -1.096*** -1.758***  -1.163*** 
 (0.149)  (0.005) (0.114) (0.110) (0.132) (0.109) (0.454)  (0.354) 
Observations 45,999  84,342 84,342 84,342 84,342 84,342 84,342  12,842 
Number of Banks 2,582  4,284 4,284 4,284 4,284 4,284 4,284  718 
R-squared 0.078  0.163 0.177 0.195 0.163 0.195 0.713  0.370 
F-Statistics 41.89  223.2 224.1 185.1 134.8 184.9 1754  63.01 
See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table III. Spread Model   
 
This table reports estimations of the Spread model (Equation (2)) using quarterly data of 6,921 commercial banks between 2007:Q3-2016:Q3 Small Banks are defined as commercial banks with 
total assets below $100 million. Medium Banks are commercial banks with total assets between $100 million and $1 billion. Large Banks are defined as commercial banks with total assets above 
$1 billion. We estimate our model using a dynamic panel setting and the fixed effects technique with standard errors clustered at the bank level. 
The first column presents our analysis for Small Banks. We regress Spread on its own lagged value and our variables of interest, namely, Fiduciary, Annuities, Insurance, Investment Banking, 
Loan Servicing, Securities Brokerage, Loan Sale, and Service Charge, and control variables. Columns (2) & (3) illustrate our results for Medium Banks. In column (2), we estimate the Spread 
model and in column (3), we use Yield on Real Estate Loans as the dependent variable. Columns (4) to (9) display the estimations for Large Banks, where Spread, Cost of Fund, Yield on Total 
Loans, Yield on Real Estate Loans, Yield on C&I Loans and Yield on Consumer Loans are used as the dependent variables, respectively. Loan portfolio characteristics, namely, C&I Loans, 
Agricultural Loan, Consumer Loans, All Other Loans and Loan Commitment are not included when we use yield on a particular loan‟s type as the dependent variable. Non-interest income items, 
i.e. Fiduciary, Annuities, Insurance, Investment Banking, Loan Servicing, Securities Brokerage, Loan Sale, Service Charge, and Inefficiency are scaled by total assets in lieu of total operating 
income. Year and quarter dummies are included in the model, but not reported in the table. 
Variables (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Small Banks  Medium Banks  Large Banks 
Spread  Spread  
Yield on  
Real Estate Loans 
 Spread  Cost of Fund 
Yield on  
Total Loans 
Yield on  
Real Estate Loans 
Yield on  
C&I Loans 
Yield on  
Consumer Loans 
L. Dependent Variable (β1) 0.576***  0.650*** 0.529***  0.695*** 0.762*** 0.663*** 0.601*** 0.540*** 0.598*** 
 (0.007)  (0.005) (0.008)  (0.012) (0.009) (0.016) (0.019) (0.026) (0.024) 
Fiduciary (β21) 0.504  -0.176 -0.419*  -0.584** -0.172 -0.807*** -0.369 -1.246 -0.735 
 (0.953)  (0.160) (0.225)  (0.230) (0.160) (0.253) (0.394) (0.895) (1.356) 
Annuities (β22) 2.733  1.124** -0.333  0.633 -0.964* 0.484 1.572 -3.330 0.629 
 (5.880)  (0.566) (0.686)  (1.070) (0.531) (1.117) (1.600) (3.808) (6.665) 
Insurance (β23) 0.509**  0.375** 0.216  -0.230 0.097 0.264 0.221 1.099 2.013 
 (0.231)  (0.186) (0.286)  (0.390) (0.134) (0.460) (0.510) (1.019) (2.339) 
Investment Banking (β24) -3.620  -0.122 0.538  -1.179 -0.416 -1.605 -0.931 -5.934** -7.596* 
 (9.437)  (0.638) (1.094)  (1.016) (0.395) (1.207) (1.607) (2.386) (4.411) 
Loan Servicing (β25) 0.301  -0.021 -0.103  -0.521 0.086 -0.447 -0.807* -0.708 1.232 
 (0.480)  (0.148) (0.248)  (0.334) (0.088) (0.368) (0.463) (0.850) (1.188) 
Securities Brokerage (β26)  3.069  0.258 -0.513  0.562 -1.057** -1.414* -1.314 -6.604** -7.185* 
 (2.612)  (0.334) (0.555)  (0.683) (0.413) (0.789) (1.243) (2.756) (4.308) 
Loan Sale (β27) -0.036  -0.072** -0.080  -0.242*** -0.117*** -0.442*** -0.326** -0.387 -0.441 
 (0.119)  (0.034) (0.052)  (0.065) (0.033) (0.075) (0.127) (0.246) (0.330) 
Service Charge (β28)  0.664***  0.727*** 0.026  0.856*** -0.082 0.373 0.364 0.340 0.987 
 (0.113)  (0.080) (0.114)  (0.221) (0.097) (0.237) (0.309) (0.720) (1.120) 
Capital (β3) 0.023***  0.017*** 0.002  0.017*** -0.005*** 0.007** 0.011*** 0.019** -0.010 
 (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.015) 
Inefficiency (β4) 0.272***  0.272*** 0.194***  0.376*** 0.013 0.489*** 0.549*** 0.168 0.327 
 (0.023)  (0.016) (0.023)  (0.047) (0.018) (0.060) (0.071) (0.133) (0.247) 
Liquidity (β5) -0.012***  -0.010*** 0.004***  -0.007*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003 0.005 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Interest Rate Risk (β6) 0.002***  0.003*** 0.001**  0.003*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
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 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Core Deposits (β7) 0.006***  0.006*** 0.002***  0.005*** -0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002** -0.001 0.003 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Wage (β8) -0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Size (β9) -0.056**  -0.033*** -0.031*  0.031* 0.030*** 0.099*** 0.146*** 0.121* 0.096 
 (0.023)  (0.011) (0.017)  (0.017) (0.008) (0.022) (0.029) (0.071) (0.094) 
C&I Loans (β10) 0.001  0.001**   0.000 -0.000 -0.001    
 (0.001)  (0.000)   (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)    
Agricultural Loans (β11) 0.005***  0.005***   0.006 -0.001 -0.004    
 (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)    
Consumer Loans (β12) 0.002*  0.004***   0.002 -0.002*** 0.000    
 (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)    
All Other Loans (β13) -0.005***  -0.004***   -0.004*** 0.001** -0.003**    
 (0.002)  (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)    
Loan Commitment (β14) 0.001  0.002***   -0.000 -0.001 -0.002**    
 (0.001)  (0.000)   (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)    
Constant (β0) 1.285***  0.713*** 2.240***  -0.480* -0.058 -0.756** -1.355*** -0.170 -0.359 
 (0.275)  (0.149) (0.229)  (0.288) (0.120) (0.352) (0.492) (1.197) (1.500) 
            
Observations 45,999  84,342 84,342  12,842 12,842 12,842 12,842 12,842 12,842 
Number of Banks 2,582  4,284 4,284  718 718 718 718 718 718 
R-squared 0.563  0.651 0.814  0.709 0.984 0.906 0.834 0.549 0.475 
F-Statistics 708.0  1658 5635  411.5 6510 2099 1167 239.5 120.2 
See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 43 
Table IV. Profit Complementarities Analysis 
 
This table reports profit complementarities analysis (Equation (3)) for joint production of the non-interest activities and loans 
for Small, Medium and Large Banks. Small Banks are defined as commercial banks with total assets below $100 million. 
Medium Banks are commercial banks with total assets between $100 million and $1 billion. Large Banks are defined as 
commercial banks with total assets above $1 billion. The study covers the post-crisis period 2009:Q3-2016:Q3. 
The first column present the results for the profit complementarity analysis under the intermediation approach following 
Berger and Mester (1997). In the second column, the multi-product profit function is defined based on the production 
approach following Berger and DeYoung (1997). 
The results for Small, Medium and Large Banks are presented in panels (A), (B) and (C), respectively. MP_Y1 = Marginal 
profit of loans. MP_Y4 = Marginal profit of the non-interest activities. NC = Necessary condition for realizing pair-wise 
profit complementarities. PPC = Pair-wise profit complementarity.  
 
 Intermediation Approach Production Approach 
(A) 
 
(1) (2) 
S
m
al
l 
B
an
k
s 
(1) MP_Y1 0.12% 0.08% 
(2) MP_Y4 36.79% 35.47% 
(3) NC -10.25% -8.62% 
(4) PPC -0.000024500 -0.000021100 
(5) Economic Magnitude -0.292% -0.356% 
(B) 
   
M
ed
iu
m
 B
an
k
s 
(1) MP_Y1 0.11% 0.09% 
(2) MP_Y4 25.28% 24.49% 
(3) NC -0.16% 0.18% 
(4) PPC 0.000000303 0.000000383 
(5) Economic Magnitude 0.028% 0.041% 
(C) 
   
L
ar
g
e 
B
an
k
s 
(1) MP_Y1 0.23% 0.22% 
(2) MP_Y4 15.58% 14.74% 
(3) NC -3.68% -3.56% 
(4) PPC -0.000000010 -0.000000010 
(5) Economic Magnitude -0.029% -0.029% 
 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 44 
Table V. Crisis and Post-Crisis Periods  
 
This table reports estimations of the Credit Risk and Spread models (Equations (1) & (2)) using quarterly data for Medium 
and Large Banks during 2007:Q3-2016:Q3. Medium Banks are commercial banks with total assets between $100 million and 
$1 billion. Large Banks are defined as commercial banks with total assets above $1 billion. We use Loan Loss Provision as 
the primary proxy for Credit Risk. We estimate our model using a dynamic panel setting and the fixed effects technique. 
The first two columns report the estimations of the Credit Risk model for Medium and Large Banks, respectively. Columns 
(3) and (4) present the results for the Spread model. In all four specifications, year dummies are replaced by Crisis, which is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one for the crisis period, 2007:Q3-2009:Q2, and zero otherwise. We add the 
interaction term between Fiduciary and Crisis in all specifications. The control variables described in Equations (1) and (2) 
are included, but not reported in the table. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Variables Credit Risk  Spread 
 Medium Banks Large Banks  Medium Banks Large Banks 
L. Dependent Variable (α1) 0.223*** 0.420***  0.658*** 0.711*** 
 (0.008) (0.023)  (0.005) (0.012) 
Fiduciary (α21) -0.007*** 0.001  -0.414** -0.883*** 
 (0.002) (0.006)  (0.167) (0.219) 
Fid×Crisis (α21Cr) 0.002* -0.002  0.550*** 0.259* 
 (0.001) (0.003)  (0.125) (0.140) 
Crisis (αCr) -0.043*** 0.028*  -0.087*** -0.073*** 
 (0.004) (0.015)  (0.004) (0.011) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant (α0) -0.472*** -0.170  1.386*** 0.732*** 
 (0.113) (0.317)  (0.127) (0.251) 
      
Observations 84,342 12,842  84,342 12,842 
Number of Banks 4,284 718  4,284 718 
R-squared 0.158 0.326  0.648 0.705 
F-Statistics 195.4 66.18  2013 498.8 
H0: α21 = α21Cr = 0 (F-stat.) 11.07*** 0.251  11.18*** 9.811*** 
H0: α21 + α21Cr = 0 (F-stat.) 4.800** 0.007  0.505 5.812** 
See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table VI. Franchise Value Model   
 
This table illustrates the results of the Franchise Value model (Equation (5)) using 1,840 quarterly  data observations on 
Medium Banks between 2007:Q3-2016:Q3. Medium Banks are commercial banks with total assets between $100 million and 
$1 billion. We use the ratio of market to book value of equity capital (Market to Book Value) as a proxy for Franchise Value. 
We estimate our model using the fixed effects technique.  
In the first column, we regress Market to Book Value on our variables of interest, namely, Fiduciary, Annuities, Insurance, 
Investment Banking, Loan Servicing, Securities Brokerage, Loan Sale, and Service Charge, and control variables. In column 
(2) we follow Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) and cluster the standard errors at both the bank and time levels. Column 
(3) displays the result when we use the lagged value of our explanatory variables. In column (4), we use a dynamic panel 
setting by introducing the lagged value of the dependent variable in the right-hand-side of the equation. In column (5), we 
scale non-interest income items by total assets instead of total operating income. Year and quarter dummies are included in 
the model, but not reported in the table. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L. Dependent Variable    0.758*** 0.754*** 
    (0.021) (0.021) 
Fiduciary (λ11) 6.440** 6.440** 10.797*** 3.028*** 316.362*** 
 (2.822) (3.006) (2.751) (1.084) (109.825) 
Annuities (λ12) -12.642 -12.642* -6.869 -1.014 -111.203 
 (7.997) (7.183) (7.718) (1.544) (139.598) 
Insurance (λ13) -1.483 -1.483 -1.613 -0.750 -33.052 
 (1.186) (1.420) (1.123) (0.924) (54.435) 
Investment Banking (λ14) -13.589 -13.589 -21.818*** -2.300 -242.113 
 (10.489) (10.773) (8.231) (6.170) (439.399) 
Loan Servicing (λ15) 5.164* 5.164* 5.686** 0.939 169.847*** 
 (2.729) (2.704) (2.344) (0.884) (63.926) 
Securities Brokerage (λ16)  -3.927 -3.927 -4.369 -0.998 -119.585 
 (4.493) (4.438) (4.109) (1.083) (104.636) 
Loan Sale (λ17) 0.364 0.364 0.589 0.290 17.695 
 (0.470) (0.489) (0.592) (0.257) (17.793) 
Service Charge (λ18)  1.625 1.625 1.868 0.514 77.817** 
 (1.044) (1.053) (1.129) (0.401) (37.296) 
Credit Risk (λ2) -6.738* -6.738* -13.879*** -0.636 -0.613 
 (3.456) (3.610) (3.784) (2.778) (2.880) 
Inefficiency (λ3) -0.321*** -0.321*** -0.379*** -0.108** -0.101* 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.126) (0.051) (0.052) 
Core Deposits (λ4) 0.085 0.085 0.103 0.071 0.035 
 (0.209) (0.216) (0.177) (0.083) (0.084) 
Capital (λ5) 0.572 0.572 1.140 0.205 0.152 
 (1.037) (1.006) (1.178) (0.460) (0.456) 
Size (λ6) 7.140 7.140 8.610 -0.948 -1.176 
 (7.693) (7.474) (8.879) (3.029) (3.088) 
Constant (λ0) 1.395 62.817 -21.876 30.560 36.255 
 (108.138) (109.851) (121.650) (41.878) (42.795) 
      
Observations 1,840 1,840 1,585 1,585 1,585 
Number of Banks 93 93 86 86 86 
R-squared 0.326 0.688 0.320 0.724 0.725 
F-statistics 7.781 . 11.39 162.2 168.1 
See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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This table presents description of variables used in this study. 
Dependent Variables Description 
Loan Loss Provision 
The ratio of loan loss provisions to average gross loans. Loan loss provision is the expense that banks incur to 
increase loan loss reserves or to write-off a loan.  
Non-performing Loans 
The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. Non-performing loans consist of non-accrual loans and loans 
which are past due for 90 days or more and still accruing. 
Spread Equals (Interest income / average earning assets) – (interest expense / average interest-bearing liabilities). 
Cost of Fund 
Total interest expense as a percent of, sum of average interest bearing liabilities and average noninterest 
bearing deposits. 
Yield on Total Loans Interest income on total loans & leases divided by average total loans & leases. 
Yield on Real Estate Loans Interest income on real estate loans divided by average real estate loans. 
Yield on C&I Loans Interest income on commercial & industrial loans / average commercial & industrial loans. 
Yield on Consumer Loans 
Interest and fee income on consumer loans other than credit card plans as a percent of average consumer loans 
other than credit card plans. 
Fiduciary Dummy Takes the value one for banks with fiduciary income, and zero otherwise. 
Market to Book Value The market value of equity capital divided by total book value of equity capital. 
Variable of Interest32  
Fiduciary  Income from fiduciary activities. 
Annuities Fees and commissions from annuity sales. 
Insurance Underwriting income from insurance and reinsurance activities and income from other insurance activities. 
Loan Servicing Net servicing fees. 
Loan Sale Net gains (losses) on sales of loans and leases. 
Investment Banking Investment banking, advisory, and underwriting fees and commissions 
Securities Brokerage Fees and commissions from securities brokerage 
Service Charge 
Service charges on deposit accounts in domestic offices, income and fees from the printing and sale of checks, 
income and fees from automated teller machines and bank card and credit card interchange fees. 
Control Variables  
Capital Equity capital to asset ratio. 
Inefficiency Total non-interest expense divided by total operating revenue33. 
Risk Weighted Assets 
The ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets. Risk weighted assets are defined by the Basel Accord to 
measure the riskiness of banks‟ assets, including off balance sheet items. 
Core Deposit The share of core deposits in total liabilities. 
Liquidity The ratio of liquid assets to total liabilities. 
Interest Rate Risk 
Difference between loans and securities with maturity over one year and liabilities with maturity more than 
one year divided by total assets.  
Loan Commitment The ratio of face value of unused credit lines and loans commitment to total assets. 
Loan Growth Quarterly growth rate of gross loans. 
Real Estate Loans The ratio of loans secured by real estate to total loans. 
C&I Loans The ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total loans. 
Agricultural Loans The ratio of loans for the purpose of financing agricultural production to total loans. 
Consumer Loans The ratio of consumer loans to total loans. 
All Other Loans The ratio of all other loans to total loans. 
Short-Term Loans The ratio of loans and leases with a remaining maturity of one year or less to total loans. 
Wage The salaries and employee benefits divided by number of full time equivalent employees. 
Size Logarithm of total assets. 
Crisis Takes the value one for the 2007:Q3 – 2009:Q2 period, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
                                                 
32
 The income from non-interest activities is measured as a percentage of total net operating income following 
the existing literature (Stiroh 2004). For Equation (2) we scale non-interest income items by total assets to avoid 
a mechanical inverse relationship between the share of non-interest income in total operating income and Spread.  
33
 In Spread model, i.e. Equation (2), Inefficiency is defined as total non-interest expense divided by total assets. 
